STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

ACCESSING THE RESERVE COMPONENTS IN RESPONSE TO ATTACKS INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The threat of terrorist attacks against United States (US) interests has become a high-priority national security concern. These threats come from unconventional, asymmetrical, and transnational sources. The objective of these attacks is to inflict the greatest amount of death and destruction for the least investment in materials and manpower. The terrorists employ weapons of mass destruction because of their effectiveness in achieving this end. The US government has enacted legislation to meet this threat and placed the Department of Defense (DoD) at the forefront of these measures. One of DoD's most significant actions was the decision to integrate the Reserve Components (RC) into the domestic response of managing the consequences of attacks involving weapons of mass destruction.

Many challenging issues arise related to accessing the Reserve Components for employment in this mission. These issues involve all of the force integration functional areas. This paper investigates structuring, training, and deploying. Also discussed is the fundamental issue of missioning of RC forces for CoM requirements. This paper will explore these issues and present some recommendations for changes in these force integration functional areas. These changes will facilitate the ultimate objective of accessing and employing trained and ready RC forces in this new and vital aspect of military assistance to civilian authorities.

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ACCESSING THE RESERVE COMPONENTS IN RESPONSE TO ATTACKS INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

The end of the 20th century brought with it an end to the long fought struggle between the two dominant social, economic, and political leaders of the world. The decades long Cold War is over and the United States of America emerged as the victor. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States by default has become the preeminent world power. This change in the balance of world power has resulted, however, in a new dilemma for the United States (US).

Although the US no longer faces a singular strong global opponent, many groups seek to remove the US from its position of world leadership and disrupt the American way of life. These groups include rogue states or nations, international criminals, transnational organizations, and domestic malcontents who seek to achieve their objectives through any means possible. Collectively, the new threat is referred to as asymmetric forces. Their attacks are asymmetrical because they use weapons, conventional or unconventional, in ways that avoid U.S. strengths. The objective of asymmetric attacks is usually to inflict the greatest amount of death and destruction for the least investment in materials and manpower. The employment of asymmetric or unconventional weapons, therefore, is their preferred option for pursuing their objective.

Increasingly, current and future threats to US security will come from these unconventional, asymmetrical, and transnational sources. Some state or non-state actors may resort to these asymmetric means, unconventional or inexpensive approaches, that circumvent US strengths, exploit US vulnerabilities, or confront the United States in ways that the US cannot match in kind.[1] Many of these asymmetric threat forces do not have the organization or resources to obtain and employ the implements of conventional warfare. They realize that attacking the US by conventional means would yield less than desirable results when compared to their commitment to their goals. They compensate for these deficiencies by leveraging technology and unconventional weapons as their primary tools in their war against the United States. The weapons that they employ are referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) because of the extent of death and/or destruction that is the consequence of their use. The psychological tool of terror, which is the result of the threatened employment of such weapons, is as much an element of their campaign against the US as any of the weapons of mass destruction that these groups employ.

The threat of terrorist attacks against US citizens and property, both at home and abroad, has become a high-priority national security concern. The President included specific language in the 1998 National Security Strategy and he has promulgated several initiatives to address the growing threat of terrorism.

Several studies in recent years have investigated the issue of asymmetrical threats directed toward the United States. One such study conducted by the Defense Science Board in 1997 concluded that countering threats posed by transnational forces is an important yet under-appreciated component of the core mission of the Department of Defense (DoD). Two significant findings of that study were: (1) Many

of these adversaries possess explosives, chemical, and biological agents; and (2) Transnational adversaries, in contrast to traditional terrorists, are motivated to inflict massive destruction and casualties.[2] The study recommended that DoD develop a long-term strategy to address this threat. The recommendation also suggested that this strategy leverage all of DoD's strengths and resources, to include the Reserve Components (RC).

This paper will review some of the legislation and policies that lead to the decision to use Reserve Component forces in response to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. It will examine some of the issues related to accessing military forces to support civilian authorities in managing the consequences of WMD. Finally, it will present some recommendations to facilitate the process of accessing Reserve Component forces in WMD consequence management missions.

TERRORIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES

Over the last decade, American citizens have increasingly become the victims of international terrorist attacks. The United States has been the target of over 32 percent of all terrorist attacks worldwide, second only to Israel.[3] Terrorist organizations are willing to strike; using any means possible, against symbols of US strength, our citizens, and our allies worldwide. While the globalization of transportation and communications has allowed such international terrorist and criminals to operate without geographic constraints, individual governments and their law enforcement agencies are bound by national boundaries and limited by international law.[4]

Until these incidents occurred within US cities, however, many people continued to feel that the United States was safe from terrorist attack. The bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993 demonstrated the nation's vulnerability. That bombing killed six Americans and injured more than one thousand others. In 1995, many Americans were shocked and surprised by the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, which killed 168, injured over five hundred, and caused millions of dollars in property damage. These events have forced American citizens to face the fact that terrorism is not something that only happens in foreign lands. It can and will occur in their hometowns.

As shocking as those bombings were to most Americans, the 1995 nerve agent attack on the Tokyo subway by the Aum Shinriko religious cult and the subsequent revelation of their plans to acquire and use biological weapons has added a new dimension to the threat. Many of these deadly agents and the devices to deliver them can be produced in simple laboratories or even legally purchased.[5] Small quantities of biological agents can cause massive numbers of casualties and such attacks may be executed covertly with relative ease.[6]

LEGISLATION RELATED TO TERRORISM

As noted above, recent attacks worldwide involving weapons of mass destruction have illustrated their devastating effects and the unpredictable nature of their perpetrators. These incidents have

convinced world leaders that there are a significant number of groups with the capability and will to employ weapons of mass destruction to promote their agendas. Secretary of Defense William Cohen summed up the US assessment of the WMD threat best in his comments to the National Press Club on March 17, 1998 when he stated "Its not a question of *if*, but *when*."

President Clinton has made defending the United States against such weapons a top national security objective as demonstrated by the attention given to this issue in the 1998 National Security Strategy. Three other important policy documents issued by the Clinton administration were Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) 39, 62, and 63. These documents form the basis for the current strategy for countering terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction against US citizens, facilities, and interests.

Two major initiatives undertaken by the President Clinton and the US Congress have significant ly improved planning and preparing for a national response to emergencies arising from terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. They are the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 and the DoD Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction.

DEFENSE AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ACT OF 1996

Public Law 104-201, commonly known and Nunn-Lugar-Domenici (NLD) Act after its co-sponsors, has proven to be a pivotal policy document for the US strategy in addressing asymmetrical threats. This congressional legislation outlined measures in four major categories of issues to address the nation's critical lack of preparedness for the proliferation of WMD.

The section of the law that deals with domestic preparedness directs the President to take the following actions.

- Establish programs to enhance the capability of the federal government to respond to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.
- Provide enhanced support to improve the capabilities of state and local emergency response agencies to prevent and respond to such incidents a both the national and the local level.[7]

These actions resulted in some specific responsibilities for the Department of Defense. One of the more significant results was the concept of formally integrating Reserve Component forces in consequence management (CoM) activities following a WMD attack.

DOD PLAN FOR INTEGRATING NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE COMPONENT SUPPORT FOR RESPONSE TO ATTACKS USING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 and the Defense Science Board 1997 Summer Study Task Force report on DoD Responses to Transnational Threats resulted in the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) directing a feasibility assessment of integrating the National Guard and Reserve Components into the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici sponsored WMD Domestic Preparedness programs. Subsequently the Under Secretary of the Army developed the DoD Plan for

Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction. The plan was implemented as Defense Reform Initiative Directive (DRID) #25: DoD Plan for Integration of the National Guard and Reserve Component into domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Response.

The Consequence Management Program Integration Office (CoM PIO) was established to refine and implement the requirements of the plan. The CoM PIO is responsible for executing an aggressive and complex five-year program that is tasked to:

- Define response requirements,
- Develop doctrine for new and existing units to perform the CoM mission,
- Develop and implement a training program to enhance and apply current wartime skill to the CoM mission,
- Develop and plan CoM training exercises, and
- Integrate current and emerging technology to equip units for the CoM mission.

The objective of this effort is to improve current military capabilities in order to support the local, state, and federal agency CoM response to terrorist WMD attacks. The plan outlines concepts to fill existing deficiencies in CoM response capabilities. It does so by developing opportunities and leveraging Reserve Component assets and capabilities into the local, state, and federal interagency effort to assist civilian emergency first responders (EFR). Those assets and capabilities include nuclear, chemical, and biological (NBC) reconnaissance and decontamination, medical, communications and information management, security, transportation, engineering, logistical support, mass care, and mortuary affairs.

MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE WMD RESPONSE

The Active Component (AC) elements of the United States Armed Forces, are not our only assets for meeting threats to our national security. Moreover, because of other commitments worldwide, AC forces may not be the best option in every response to a WMD attack. The active forces are widely dispersed across the United States and abroad preventing them from rapidly responding to a WMD attack on the United States or its territories. More importantly, they are allocated to support the war-fighting missions of the various geographic Commanders-In-Chief (CINC) worldwide.

Reserve Component forces, however, are considered particularly well-suited to the domestic WMD response mission. The RC infrastructure is geographically dispersed in more than four thousand communities across the country in every state and territory. Many members of the Reserve Components have well-established links with local fire, police, and emergency medical personnel because of their civilian occupations. Because of this dispersion and their familiarity with the local community and the civilian emergency responders, the battlefield and the friendly forces, RC forces have been very effective in supporting past disaster response activities.

Due to previous experience with disasters at the local level, many RC units are already familiar with disaster response requirements. Many of the tasks associated with potential WMD consequence

management missions are similar to tasks currently performed by many RC units under existing domestic support arrangements. Examples include population control and evacuation, assisting law enforcement authorities, and providing temporary shelter and food. These task also include providing physical security for key infrastructure assets.[8] This knowledge and experience will enable the RC forces to be effective in the response to a WMD attack.

Another important consideration in the decision to employ RC forces in WMD incident response is the types of missions or tasks that could be leveraged to support anticipated WMD CoM requirements. Defense Reform Initiative Directive #25 outlines the types of capabilities that will be required in a WMD response effort. Those capabilities are combat support missions. The preponderance of combat support assets resides in the Reserve Component and represents the core competencies of the majority of reserve units and personnel. Although these types of forces have been very active in recent years supporting missions worldwide, their employment in the WMD response is deemed appropriate for the reasons mentioned above. Additionally, the employment of RC forces in this role would reduce this requirement for the Active Component forces.

ACCESSING THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

The issue of the accessing Reserve Component forces for a WMD CoM mission presents challenges; challenges not only for the war planners but also for the force managers and policy-makers. Possible solutions for the employment of RC forces are complex and present new paradigms in force management and force integration for Reserve Component forces. Some specific force integration functional areas affected include structuring, training, and deploying. Additionally, a fundamental mission analysis must be undertaken to serve as the basis for changes in force integration functional areas.

Reserve Component forces are currently organized for full-scale combat in a major theater of war. Does this organizational structure facilitate CoM mission requirements? These organizational structures have been inadequate to meet the requirements for many of the missions conducted during the last decade. In many cases, force structures were task organized into ad hoc units to fit the mission requirements.

Do these RC forces receive all of the necessary training required to support a CoM mission as part of their standard military training? Are the forces familiar with the operational procedures of the civilian emergency first responders and other response organizations? Is their military equipment compatible with that of the civilian emergency first responders? Does it meet Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) and National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) standards? Should it meet such standards?

These questions are not limited to the employment of RC forces in the CoM role. They are applicable to all military forces supporting a WMD response. The answers to these and other questions are not easily obtained. Developing solutions will require the combined efforts of DoD and many other government agencies and organizations in cooperation with civilian government representation at the state and local levels. Currently organizations and agencies primarily responsible for the domestic

response to terrorist attacks are addressing these issues. Some of these organizations are Department of Justice (DoJ), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), DoD, and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).

MISSIONING

Fundamentally, military organizations are founded on a mission or capability requirement. Organizations are designed and structured along two primary dimensions. The first is task or functional specialization. The second is integration used to link functionally unique designs into the overall process or organization.[9]

The consideration of unit missions or capabilities was fundamental in the decision to employ Reserve Component forces in the response to WMD attacks. The primary purpose for maintaining Reserve Component forces is to provide a force multiplier in support of the war-fighting missions of the Department of Defense. They, like their Active Component counterparts, are apportioned to support the war-fighting mission of the geographic Commanders-In-Chief (CINC) in a major theater of war (MTW). The RC force is structured to provide the additional combat and support forces to augment AC forces in executing our national military strategy to fight and win in two nearly simultaneous MTWs. The active force cannot accomplish this task without the reserve forces. As a result of this integration, Reserve Component forces have been employed in every operation conducted over the last two decades.

In order to support both the war-fighting and consequence management missions, the Reserve Component Employment Study 2005, suggested dual missioning of RC units for WMD consequence management missions. Under this concept, selected RC units could be assigned domestic disaster response missions in addition to their existing war-fighting mission. This dual missioning would be most effective for RC units whose wartime missions can be directly applied to a CoM requirement. Such mission might include chemical weapons detection and reconnaissance, mass decontamination, medical treatment, transportation, and even communications. These units could be most easily redirected to a CoM response and could have an immediate impact in such missions. However, once committed to such a mission, they would not be available to support a response to a MTW or even a smaller-scale contingency (SSC). Conversely, once committed to a MTW or SSC, these forces would not be available to respond to a WMD attack.

Another of the study's recommendations suggested the remissioning of selected RC units from their existing MTW-related commitments. The assignment of a new mission would provide consequence management capabilities in RC units that are not currently organized to perform a specialized combat support task or a task that is directly transferable to the CoM requirements.[10] Remissioning could provide a CoM capability in regions where the local RC capabilities do not directly match CoM requirements. An example of this would be an Army National Guard or Marine Reserve Infantry, Armor, or Artillery unit, or an Air Force Fighter Wing. Remissioning would also require major force restructuring, with far-reaching impacts in equipping, and training for the new CoM mission. The impact on the continued ability to

support MTW missions would also be a major consideration. The study concluded restructuring a number of RC units to focus on specialized consequence management tasks could be cost effective considering the cost of maintaining skills for both warfighting and specialized WMD consequence management support missions.[11] This option may prove to be the least practical in today's political environment of decreasing or, at best, zero-growth in military force structure. Since the warfighting mission of most support units is directly transferable to support a WMD response mission, remissioning is not a significant issue. Organizational structure and equipment to support the CoM mission, however, are issues that must be addressed.

STRUCTURING

Most combat support and combat service support units resident in the Army National Guard are divisional support elements. As part of a battalion, brigade, or division's logistical support structure, employment of these units significantly reduces that battalion's, brigade's, or division's readiness for deployment in support of a MTW or SSC.

Army Reserve combat support and combat service support units are primarily Corps support elements. Though modular in design, the organization and interdependency of the modules, platoons of companies and companies of battalions, sometimes makes it difficult to deploy and employ these units in small increments. Also as Corps level assets, their apportionment or assignment has less of a direct impact on the warfighting capability of a maneuver force commander at the battalion, brigade, and division level.

Deployments over the last ten years have proven that RC support elements are needed in large numbers for all operations. These missions require incremental capabilities that do not coincide with approved authorization documents that serve as the basis for mobilization force structure. These operational deployments have required nonstandard support elements. For example, units that are structured to mobilize at battalion level are required in company or platoon sized elements. Similarly, units that are structured to deploy at company or platoon level are required in platoon, squad, or team-sized elements. For these mobilizations, personnel and equipment requirements are identified and ad hoc organizations are formed to meet the mission requirement. These elements are deployed under a temporary force structure document that is a derivative of the unit's official force structure authorization document for deployment management. In Army parlance, these derivative authorization structures are commonly referred to as derivative Unit Identification Code(s) (UIC).

Department of Defense Reform Initiative Directive #25 identifies fifteen support elements that will be required in a WMD response. These elements will require some specialized organization, equipment, and training to prepare them to respond to a WMD incident. In order to facilitate mobilization and deployment, functional modules to perform the required WMD tasks should be organized with standardized force structures for personnel skills and equipment requirements. These structures should be compatible across all service components providing that capability. These modules should also be

organized as a subset of the existing unit structure with a permanent subordinate derivative force authorization document.

Personnel assigned to these positions would receive specialized training and equipment to responsd to the WMD mission. Personnel could be rotated into these positions to increase the personnel pool for WMD response missions and relieve the stress related to this high-risk mission. Ultimately, when the number of trained personnel is sufficient, personnel could be tasked to be on-call to support the mission for specific for periods. No longer would it be necessary to depend on volunteers to fill critical personnel requirements during a WMD crises.

TRAINING

Historically, the most common military capabilities needed in a CoM response have been support services. These include power generation, water purification, transportation, communications, and medical support. Other specialized capabilities that would be helpful in a WMD incident response are chemical reconnaissance and decontamination, explosive ordinance disposal, mortuary affairs, and support from military technical laboratories.

Most of the capabilities identified for enhancement in the DRID #25 are found in combat support and combat service support units. These units' capabilities are directly applicable to a WMD response mission with little modification. The DoD Plan identifies fifteen capabilities that will be required in a WMD response. All of these capabilities exist in some type of support unit today. For such units, training in their primary mission tasks skills is not a significant issue. However, their current training programs do not address the differences between their military tasks and the tasks that will be required during a WMD response. The Consequence Management Program Integration Office refers to these additional training requirements as the "NBC Delta". Some common tasks that should be included in a CoM training curriculum include the following.

- Site management/crowd control,
- Identification of signs and symptoms of exposure,
- Performance of tasks while wearing personal protective equipment (PPE),
- Proper use of different types of PPE,
- Recognition and management of the psychological aspects of exposure to WMD.

A training program for all response personnel must address the emotional and psychological impact of a weapon of mass destruction on the responders to the WMD attack. The literature on terrorist attacks reveals high rates of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder after such attacks[12].

Training plans must also address specific performance tasks. The plans should first develop the overarching WMD response doctrine and outline each tasks. This new doctrine must include consideration of the condition under which the tasks are performed. Specifically, whether the military approaches to chemical and biological defense and treatment are appropriate for domestic incidents.

Some activities considered standard operating procedure in a military environment would be difficult or impossible to implement in the heterogeneous and independent civilian population.[13]

The new doctrine outlining the "NBC Delta" tasks, the condition for their execution, and the standard for their completion must be developed in coordination with civilian emergency responders and planners, as well as, private and governmental agencies at all levels; local, state, and, federal. The training plans must then be executed and exercised with private and governmental agencies at all levels to ensure that the tasks can be accomplished to the prescribed standard. Units providing a WMD response capability should ensure that the mission and its essential tasks receive the highest priority for resourcing. These training programs must also integrate efforts already undertaken by agencies such as FEMA, the Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, DHHS, and the DoD/DoJ training program under the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation.

MOBILIZING AND DEPLOYING

The pivotal task in the employment of Reserve Component forces is the requirement to bring them on official active military status. Timely mobilization of these forces is essential in providing an effective response to a WMD incident. The individual Services' mobilization processes and procedures complicate the process of accessing the RC for a WMD response. These procedures were designed, for the most part, to support large-scale mobilization for war. They are tedious, cumbersome, and, except for the National Guard response to a state-level emergency, lengthy.

The President and the Congress, at the recommendation of the SECDEF, may mobilize forces to support a given operation or contingency. The first level of involuntary mobilization authority available to the President is the Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) authority under Title 10, United States Code. Such an action would most likely be implemented as a precursor to a partial mobilization for a MTW, smaller-scale contingencies (SSC), or for a peacetime contingency operation such as the recent operations in the Balkans. As an example, more than 15,000 Reserve Component members were involuntarily mobilized for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR/JOINT GUARD.[14] Although designed for limited contingency operations, PRC has been invoked for operations other than war and domestic emergencies. For domestic emergencies and peace operations requiring Reserve Component capabilities, the current policy is to implement selective mobilization, emphasizing the use of volunteer Reserve Component personnel before seeking authority for involuntarily mobilization.[15]

The mobilization process for the Reserve Components of the Services is based primarily, on how each Service plans to integrate its RC in case of war. The mission of the Army is to take and hold ground. The Air Force secures the airspace and conducts deep strike missions. The Navy dominates the approaches from the sea to land and conducts sea-based strikes against land-based targets. The Marines deliver a rapid reaction force with special capability for littoral warfare.[16] These missions serve as the basis for how each Service organizes and resources its Reserve Component elements. These missions also determine how the Services plan for and execute the mobilization of their RC forces.

The Army and Marine Corps man, equip, and train operational units. This mission focus leads them to plan for mobilizing units and integrating them into larger fighting elements. The Navy and Air Force, on the other hand, man and train on weapons systems. Their focus on weapons systems availability allows for greater flexibility in combining weapons systems into force structures tailored to an operational requirement.[17]

The difference between stressing unit capability verses weapons system availability is the fundamental distinction in the mobilization policies of the Services. The Air Force structure has great flexibility in tailoring its forces. Its force structure documents are organized into separate personnel and equipment elements. Therefore, personnel may deploy from one location while their equipment deploys from another using different aircraft to link-up at a final destination to provide the required capability. This organizational design also greatly facilitates the mobilization process and decreases the mobilization response time.

These organizational differences have led to quite different paradigms for mobilization of the Services. The focus on operational weapons systems manned by properly trained individuals has allowed the Navy and the Air Force to meet many of their mobilization requirements using volunteers. The focus on operational units and the need for unit integrity requires the Army and Marine Corps to rely on involuntary mobilization to meet their mobilization requirements. These differences have also resulted in differences in length of the mobilization period. The Army mobilization policy has been for periods of 270 days, whereas the Navy and the Air Force has typically mobilized for periods of 180 days or less. Recently, the Army revised its mobilization policy for Army Reserve and National Guard units for operations other than war. Such operations include peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. The new policy will limit the involuntary mobilization period for to six months or 180 days. This action was taken to alleviate the strain of the frequency of RC mobilization in recent years on the Reservist and their employers.

As discussed above, mobilization procedures of the various Reserve Components vary greatly in their process and the length of time to implement them. Efforts were initiated in the November 1998 to review the mobilization process for Reserve Component forces with respect to domestic CoM support. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs conducted a series of meetings to investigate CoM mobilization requirements. Also considered was the feasibility of standardization of the mobilization requirements for the CoM mission across the services. Representatives from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, DOMS/Consequence Management Program Integration Office, and the Reserve Components of the Services were members of the working group. Although some new options were presented and explored, the issue was essentially tabled to allow for some experience under the current system of mobilization in response to domestic CoM requirements.[18]

Structuring the elements under permanent derivative force structure authorization documents would facilitate mobilization. Current mobilization procedures do not support rapid deployment. If the

above steps in organization and training are taken, both the personnel and equipment are primed for mobilization and deployment. Specific personnel would be on standby status. Separate equipment sets would be organized to support the unit's primary and WMD missions. Once alerted, this would enable the WMD response element to mobilize rapidly and deploy in far less time than it takes today. Additionally, the unit must give equal priority to its WMD tasks when resourcing its training requirements. The unit must also track its readiness for accomplishing its WMD mission.

The personnel and equipment procedures outlined above are currently being used successfully by the Federal Emergency Management Agency Urban Search and Rescue Teams and the Department of Energy Disaster Response Teams. These agencies provide a civilian federal disaster response capability under conditions similar to those faced by Reserve Component forces. The personnel that man these teams, like members of the Reserve Components, have other occupations and responsibilities. Though many work in related occupations, as do many Reserve Component personnel, they do not routinely perform the tasks required of them during a WMD response on a daily basis. These emergency response teams are required to deploy four to six hours from notification. They consistently meet this requirement. Through planning, training, and exercise, these agencies have overcome many of the challenges currently faced by the Reserve Component in responding to a WMD mission.

CONCLUSION

Legislation related to terrorism and managing the consequences of an attack involving weapons of mass destruction has outlined a new and vital role for Reserve Component forces. The President, Congress, the interagency leadership including the Secretary of Defense, and the Service Chiefs are committed to meeting this growing threat to our national security. Organizations at all levels of government are taking measures to prepare for the eventuality of the next unwarranted attack against the United States, its citizens, or interests by some rogue nation, organization, or individual willing to employ a weapon of mass destruction.

The Department of Defense has already taken steps to provide the framework for a response structure that will be capable of providing coordinated and timely assistance to civilian authorities following a WMD incident. After a thorough analysis of CoM requirements, DoD recognized the significant contribution that the Reserve Components can provide in this effort. The Consequence Management Program Integration Office is spearheading the DoD effort to provide properly trained and equipped Reserve Component forces to support the DoD WMD response effort.

The Reserve Components are well suited for the WMD CoM mission. The RC posses the preponderance of support assets and skills that could be leveraged to support anticipated WMD CoM requirements. Those skills are the core competencies of the majority of reserve units and personnel. Additionally, the RC force infrastructure is widely dispersed across the US. The units' personnel are familiar with their local communities and the civilian emergency responders. Many RC units, through experience in past disasters, are already familiar with disaster response requirements and procedures. This expertise has enabled RC forces to be very effective in supporting WMD response missions.

As stated above, the support assets resident in the Reserve Components have capabilities that can be leveraged to support a WMD CoM mission. The wartime mission of most of these units can be directly applied to a CoM requirement with little modification. The Consequence Management Program Integration Office is tasked to identify the critical areas of support that DoD can provide in a WMD CoM effort and implement actions under DRID #25 to prepare RC forces to perform those tasks.

Remote jurisdictions possessing little or no response capability for a WMD attack look to the federal government for assistance. Reserve Component units in these locations may provide a solution. Local RC units not capable of CoM support missions may require complete reorganization to provide this capability. The remissioning of such units would require a considerable force management effort with far-reaching impacts in force integration. Pursuing this option will require a thorough analysis, considering second and third order effects, that could impact the Unified Command Plan, the National Military Strategy, and even the National Security Strategy.

The issues related to the employment of RC forces for a WMD CoM mission does present some challenges in force integration. Some specific force integration functional areas affected include force structure, training, mobilization, and deployment.

Since all forces are structured to support the requirements of major conflicts, consideration must be given to the efficiency and effectiveness the current force structure in meeting the requirements of conflicts of lesser intensity, specifically a WMD response mission. In order to meet the requirements of a WMD response more effectively, alternate or additional force structures must be devised to facilitate the employment of appropriate response elements. Utilization of designated functional sub-elements of the formal unit structure will facilitate the training and deployment of these WMD CoM response capabilities.

The CoM response requirements identified to support the WMD response are, in most cases, the same as the wartime missions of many Reserve Component units. There are, however, some unique training requirements for these units before they can effectively perform their support tasks in concert with civilian emergency first responders in an urban environment. There are also some unique training requirements about the types of weapons that will likely be employed, their effects, and the specialized equipment and procedures required for an adequate response under the conditions described above. Training plans must address these issues. These training plans must then be executed and exercised with private and governmental agencies at all levels to ensure that the tasks can be accomplished to the prescribed standard.

The rapid employment of these forces following a WMD incident will require the recognition of the WMD CoM response as a new and distinct mission, albeit similar to their wartime mission. These different tasks must be addressed in plans, adequately resourced, trained, and exercised.

Mobilization processes and procedures for Reserve Component forces responding to a WMD attack must be streamlined to facilitate their rapid employment. Such modifications will include changes to the organizational structure of these units. The organizational structure for personnel and equipment

must be tailored to the WMD CoM requirements. This restructuring would enable these RC forces to rapidly mobilize and deploy in far less time than it takes today.

Significant steps have been taken toward the employment of RC forces in WMD CoM. However, efficient implementation and execution will require significant coordination across the DoD and other governmental agencies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Key issues impacting on the use of Reserve Component forces in the CoM response to attacks involving weapons of mass destruction are missioning, structuring training, and deploying. All are inextricably linked. Force structure decisions are influenced by the mission. Mission requirements drive training requirements. The mission also influences force management decisions of each of the Services and their components. Specifically, force structure decisions influence the overall active to reserve force structure allocation, which impacts DoD's ability to support the warfighting requirements of the geographical Commanders-In-Chief as well as the WMD CoM mission. Additionally, mobilization issues affect DoD's ability to project forces worldwide in support of any type of contingency.

MISSIONING

Where possible the current policy of dual missioning of RC forces for the WMD CoM mission must continue. The force management process must recognize the WMD CoM mission requirements and incorporate them into the overall management of those units. Remissioning must not be undertaken without an analysis of the impacts on the total force structure. The far-reaching implications of this type of action will require a careful analysis of future force requirements.

STRUCTURING

Reserve Component organizations possessing WMD CoM response capabilities must have a specific force structure developed for that mission. They must be organized with standardized functional modules that include the required personnel skills and equipment for WMD tasks. This force structure should be the same for all service components providing that capability. The design of the modules must replicate the capabilities of the existing unit structure and be identified with an assigned derivative force authorization document and Unit Identification Code. These force structure documentation changes will facilitate mobilization and deployment.

TRAINING

Training programs for the WMD response mission must focus on the differences between military and WMD response tasks. Training requirements must address the specific tasks and the condition under which they will be performed. Finally, units must execute and validate these training programs thorough exercises with other governmental agencies.

MOBILIZING AND DEPLOYING

Changes in the force integration policies presented above will significantly improve the mobilization and deployment of RC forces for WMD CoM requirements. The suggested changes in organization and training will ensure both the personnel and equipment are prepared for rapid mobilization and deployment. Pre-configured equipment sets designed support the WMD mission would also speed up the process. The combination of these actions would enable the WMD response element to rapidly mobilize and deploy.

SUMMARY

Events worldwide have illustrated that the threat of an attack on US interest is real and probable. The more serious threat, however, is a lack of preparation or preparedness to meet this threat. The nation's leadership has recognized this reality and has taken significant measures to protect US citizens and interests at home and abroad. The Department of Defense is at the forefront of the efforts by the federal government. The Reserve Components are poised at the "Tip of the Spear" in the federal response to the unique challenges presented by consequences of incidents involving the use of weapons of mass destruction.

The Reserve Component leadership has fully committed to supporting this mission. Reserve Component personnel are eagerly awaiting the opportunity to meet the challenges of this mission. However, in order for the Reserve Component to be most effective in the implementation of the DRID #25, changes will have to be made to some existing force structure, unit missioning, training, and mobilization paradigms. These changes will facilitate the process of accessing Reserve Component forces in support CoM missions and ensure that the forces are trained and ready to accomplish any assigned task in meeting the requirements of this vital mission.

WORD COUNT = 6,421

ENDNOTES

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[14] U.S. Department of Defense, Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs 1997 (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, 1997), available from <http://raweb.osd.mil/Rfpb/chapter_1.html>, Internet, accessed 10 January 2000, 4.

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